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THE HARLAN-FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: AN ASPECT OF
JUSTICE HARLAN'S JUDICIAL EDUCATION*
CHARLES NESSON**

As a student at Harvard Law School in the early sixties, I was taught

the principles of federalism by Henry Hart, Paul Freund, Ernest Brown,

and Al Sacks, in effect by the spirit of Felix Frankfurter as then embodied
in the Harvard Law School faculty. They communicated their approval
and regard for Justice Harlan, who had taken on the cause from
Frankfurter of espousing and defending the principles of federalism. Now,

many years later, I have taken this occasion to read through many of
Harlan's papers, which he left to Princeton University, his alma mater. 1
His papers eloquently show the tremendous shaping influence that
Frankfurter had upon him, and add delightful texture to the picture of
Harlan receiving the ideals of federalism from Frankfurter and making

them his own. Frankfurter was Harlan's teacher. Within the framework
of their relationship, Harlan built much of his sense of himself as a
Supreme Court Justice.
Frankfurter deliberately set out to become Harlan's teacher. He began

this relationship when Harlan was nominated to fill Augustus Hand's

vacated seat on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1954. Frankfurter
wrote to Harlan, emphasizing their connection through Emory Buckner,
who had been Frankfurter's best friend in law school, 2 and who was

Harlan's great mentor in New York law practice. 3 Invoking Buckner's

* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991).
** Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. My thanks to Charles Fried, Al Sacks,
Steve Wormeil, and Fern Nesson for helpful conversations and suggestions in the course
of preparing this paper, and to Ryan Stoll for his able work as my research assistant.
1. The John Marshall Harlan papers are at the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton
University. All letters, notes, memoranda, and other unpublished materials cited in this
article are located therein, unless otherwise noted.
2. When Frankfurter was appointed to the law school faculty, Buckner wrote to
Roscoe Pound describing Frankfurter as "the closest friend I have and the real thing."
MARTIN MAYER, EMORY BUCKNER 4 (1968) (quoting Letter from Emory Buckner to
Roscoe Pound (Nov. 29, 1914)). The Buckner-Frankfurter friendship continued unabated
until Buckner's premature death in 1941. Id.
3. Buckner trained Harlan as a litigator at Root, Clark, Buckner & Ballantine. When
he became U.S. Attorney in New York, he hired Harlan as an Assistant District Attorney.
Buckner later returned to Root, Clark, where he helped Harlan become the firm's top
litigator. See David L. Shapiro, Biographical Note to THE EvOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL
PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. HARLAN xvii, xvii-xx
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name and memory with Harlan was akin to invoking a deity.
Frankfurter wrote to Harlan:

My Dear John: Hardly a day passes that something does not turn
up that makes me miss Buck. How he would rejoice to have you
on the Court of Appeals! I do, because of my confidence that you
will be worthy of the great company of the past whom you are
joining.4
Frankfurter went on to name the great judges of the Second Circuit
and to express his high expectation for Harlan's prospective judicial
opinions. 5 Harlan replied:
If I am able to realize even in small measure some of the
expectations you have been good enough to express I shall be
more than satisfied. It is indeed a sobering and humbling thing to
think of oneself as joining the galaxy of distinguished men
refeired to in your letter.... While I was not so fortunate as to

have sat at your feet at the Harvard Law School, I have always
felt some sort of special bond with you through our mutual and
devoted friend ERB.6
Harlan had served on the Second Circuit for less than a year when
President Eisenhower nominated him to the Supreme Court.7 After Harlan
joined the Supreme Court, Frankfurter actively pursued the mentor's role.
They overlapped as colleagues on the Court from March, 1955, when
Harlan took his seat, until August, 1962, when Frankfurter retired after
his second stroke. Over this period Frankfurter wrote to Harlan often.
Frankfurter was a man who loved to communicate in writing. He
wrote with remarkable fluency and little restraint, at least when writing to
a confidant. He also barraged Harlan with talk and calls. One gets a sense
of Frankfurter's intensity in a comment Harlan made to a Frankfurter
biographer: "You had to make it clear," Harlan said, "that you did not
like telephone calls at five in the morning.'
(David L. Shapiro ed., 1969).
4. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (Jan. 26, 1954).
5. See id.
6. Letter from John M. Harlan to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 2, 1954).
7. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at xxiii. President Eisenhower nominated Harlan on
Nov. 8, 1954. Id.
8. LIvA BAKiR, Fax FRANxFuTER 215 (1969).
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Frankfurter's early assessment of Harlan as a colleague on the
Supreme Court was condescending and none too charitable. In a letter to
Learned Hand, Frankfurter wrote:
[Harlan] makes me wince when he talks about questions being "in
the First Amendment area" and having "an instinct" that this or
that "power of Congress is extremely limited." ... With all his
judicial aims and character, he really has not had the appropriate
intellectual background of reading and reflection for the ultimate
task of passing on constitutionality. ....
When he went off the other day I put a copy of J.B. Thayer's
essay... into his hands, with the remark, "Please read it, then
reread it, and then read it again, and then think about it long."'
Frankfurter also commented unflatteringly to Hand about Harlan's
character:
He is not meant for battle. [He] represents at its best what I'm
told (by an esteemed Princetonian) is the dominant Princeton
ideal, to be nice, and is just the kind of person who is too ready
to have a bully like Black and a martinet like Warren have their
way.10
Frankfiuter was referring to Harlan's undergraduate career at
Princeton, where his achievements were outstanding. In the understated
words of The Daily Princetonian, Harlan was "perhaps the most
distinguished undergraduate here in his Senior year."" He chaired the
Princeton Senior Council, was president of his class, president of the Ivy
Club, and chairman of the Princetonian.'2 He was voted "most
respected" by his class, and honored by a lyric in the Faculty Song:
"Here's to Johnny Harlan-he runs the University."" 3 Frankfurter
apparently thought that Harlan garnered these accolades for being "nice."
Frankfurter mistook Harlan's civility for weakness of character. He
worried that Harlan would be a compromiser. He warned Harian:

9. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (June 30, 1957) (Felix Frankfurter
Papers, Langell Library, Harvard Law School).
10. Id.
11. Shapiro, supra note 3, at xviii (quoting THE DAILY PRINCErONIAN, Nov. 9, 1954,
at 1).
12. See id.
13. Noel F. Busch, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan 9 (1964)
(unpublished manuscript, Harlan Papers).
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John, you can always have what is called peace if you yield to the
bullies and the irrationalists. I don't mean to be extravagant but
because of such yielding to Hitler the world is now what it is."
Indeed, Harlan was sometimes nicer to Frankfurter than the latter
deserved. Frankfurter, for example, felt free to instruct Harlan even on
the pettiest of matters. When Harlan wrote "Mr. Justice Harlan, with
whom Mr. Justice X joins, dissenting," Frankfurter thought the "with"
superfluous and told Harlan to drop it. Harlan complied but employed the
same "with whom" phrasing in a later opinion. Frankfurter prodded him
with notes pushing him to drop it, even though Frankfurter was not the
Justice joining Harlan. With similar officiousness, Frankfurter instructed
Harlan on the impropriety of indicating that certiorari had been denied
when citing lower court opinions."5 Many men would have told
Frankfurter to mind his own business, but Harlan graciously welcomed the
instruction.
Frankfurter purported to teach Harlan substance as well as form.
Harlan's first serious outing on the Court came in Ellis v. Dixon, 6 in
which Harlan wrote the opinion for a bare 5-4 majority. A peace group
concerned about the Korean War had been denied use of the Yonkers
Public Schools for evening meetings, though meetings held by other
groups on other subjects had been allowed.17 The Supreme Court had
granted certiorari.1"
"Frankfurter wanted to dismiss the case on a procedural technicality,
and argued his position to Harlan in a remarkable eleven page Socratic
dialogue in which Frankfurter literally took the part of Socrates. ' 9 The
dialogue (which Frankfurter printed and circulated only to Harlan) begins
with Socrates's question:
Socrates: Tell me, my dear Marshall, what is all this fuss in
Yonkers about?'
Frankfurter (Socrates) then patronizingly spells out his analysis to his
pupil, John Marshall Harlan.
14. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (Feb. 22, 1956) (Frankfurter
Papers).
15. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (Nov. 18, 1955).
16. 349 U.S. 458 (1955).
17. See id. at 459, 460 & n.3.
18. Ellis v. Dixon, 347 U.S. 926 (1954).
19. See Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (May 17, 1955).
20. Id.
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In response to Frankfurter's Socratic dialogue, Harlan sent him a
note citing a case which foreclosed Frankfurter's line of analysis. But
Harlan did what Frankfurter wanted. He simply found another technicality
upon which to base the dismissal. Frankfurter joined Harlan's opinion,
praising it with a condescending private note, "Hallelujah! Unto us this
child is born!!" 2
Another equally curious example of Frankfurter's teaching technique
with Harlan occurred the following year. Frankfurter assaulted the stature
of Harlan's famous grandfather, the first Mr. Justice Harlan (Harlan-I, as
22
opposed to Harlan-1), renowned for his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,
in which he stated that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind."'
Frankfurter wrote to Harlan with no apparent purpose other than to
provoke, asserting that Harlan's grandfather's reputation as "the great
dissenter" was undeserved. Frankfurter asserted, "there is no evidence
whatever that Harlan-I thought that segregation was unconstitutional."'
"Harlan-I would have sustained segregation, had the issue squarely come
before the Court in his day."'
Frankfurter supported this assertion with two arguments. First,
Harlan-I repeatedly emphasized in his Plessy dissent that the case dealt
with transportation, as if there was something special about segregation in
railway cars that did not extend to schools.' Second, Harlan-I wrote an
opinion three years after Plessy, Cumming v. County Board of
Education,2' in which he sidestepped an opportunity to attack segregated
schools.' To Frankfurter, this was clear evidence that Harlan-I would
have sustained racial segregation in public schools.' 9
Harlan responded, diplomatically:

21. Note from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan on a draft opinion of Ellis v.
Dixon, circulated June 2, 1955.

22. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 559.
24. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (July 12, 1956).

25. Id.
26. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (defining the issue as whether
it is consistent with the Constitution for a state to regulate the use of a public highway by
citizens solely upon the basis of race); id. at 554, 561.
27. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
28. See id. at 543 (stating that the Court need not consider whether segregated schools
in Georgia comport with the Constitution because that issue was not presented in the

pleadings).
29. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (July 6, 1956).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

I recognize the inferences that may be drawn from Cumming, but
I still think the most that can be said is that Plessy is little basis
for thinking that the old boy would have voted against school
segregation. While he did say in Cumming that a state system of
education was a state matter he also qualified it by stating that it
could not run afoul of the Constitution-and earlier he went out
of his way to note the anti-segregation argument and left it open.
I can't prove it, but my instinct is that he would have been
against segregation-voted against it, I mean?0
Frankfurter did not let the subject drop. Like a debater, he pinned
down Harlan's concession and then pressed ahead.
You and I are not in disagreement that Harlan-I's dissent in
Plessy v.Ferguson gives no justification for assuming that he
would have found segregation unconstitutional. While you say
that that's the most that can be drawn from his dissent, I would
say that's the least that could be drawn from it.3
Harlan replied, defending his grandfather, but offering to end the
disagreement by declaring a draw:
I think you push things too far. Against what you point out, his
language in Plessy is undeniably sweeping. He repeatedly talks
about all "civil rights" being caught by the 14th Amendment, and
I find nothing to indicate that he would not have considered the
right to attend state-maintained schools as a "civil right." In
short, I think that the argument is pretty much of a stand-off; I
am not at all sure that the popular view of Plessy is not correct.
To be sure it cannot be demonstrated. 2
But Frankfurter would not relent, insisting on the last word:
Duly mindful of all you say about Plessy, I am sorry to have to
stand my ground. I can not get away from the incongruity that a
fellow who indulged in the broad rhetoric that the "Constitution
is colorblind" should have sponsored such a narrow result in
Cumming. Both opinions must be read in light of the intellectual
habits of Harlan-I. If I were dealing with a Brandeis, whose
decisions practically always sailed close to the harbor of the
30. Letter from John M. Harlan to Felix Frankfurter (July 12, 1956).
31. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (July 18, 1956).
32. Letter from John M. Harlan to Felix Frankfurter (July 28, 1956).
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specific facts of the case, a wearisome reiteration in the Plessy
dissent that it was concerned with rights on a public highway and
the intimation in Cumming that the case was confined to the
particular pleadings, would be merely characteristic of the writer.
But whatever virtues may be attributed to Harlan-I, no one, I
submit, would credit-or charge-him with having been a close
reasoner, more particularly, a writer who confined himself to the
narrow limits of a particular case.33
Why would Frankfurter choose to attack Harlan's grandfather?
Frankfurter professed only a scholar's interest in the question, offering
Harlan the following rationalization:
I need hardly tell you that the notion is widely prevalent that
Harlan anticipated striking down school segregation in his Plessy
v. Ferguson dissent. That this isn't so is, of course, important as
a matter of historic accuracy.'
Frankfurter's true message to Harlan seems to have been: "Thou shalt
have no other gods before me."'
Condescension seemed to come naturally to Frankfurter. He wrote
Harlan in 1956:
Word that you were "off for Williamsburg" is the best
communication I've had from you since you came down here. For
it lightens a concern of mine, a concern that has been weighing
on me long before B. Hand told me of his real anxiety after
learning from you of your unrelenting absorption in the Court's
work .... He asked me, "Can't you do something about it" to
which absurdity I replied, "Of course I can't-unless, perchance,
I could persuade him of which I profoundly believe, that if he
worked less he will make a better judge!" An idle brain is, I
know, the devil's workshop. But it is no less true that all work
and no play makes Jack a dull boy. To be consciously at it all the
time and not to indulge in other interests, stifles the unconscious
brooding faculties of man and limits his artistic faculties ...
Such exclusive preoccupation with the immediate problems of law
gives no opportunities for cultivating insight and imagination.
And these basics-insight and imagination-mark essential
33. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (July 31, 1956).
34. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan, supra note 31.
35. Exodus 20:3 (King James).
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differences between the great men in the Court's history and the
ordinary and pedestrian.'
Harlan responded with unfailing politeness:
Many thanks for your letter, so full of good philosophy. The last
thing I want to do is be the cause of any worry to you and B.
Hand.... Actually I've been doing no more than following the
habits of a Wall
St. lawyer in his approach to a new and
37
challenging job.
Notwithstanding Frankfurter's sometimes overbearing character,
Harlan was a willing student to Frankfiurter. He treated Frankfurter with
tremendous respect and caring. He was open to Frankfurter's ideas and
clearly respected the tradition and wisdom Frankfurter represented. They
had their disagreements, for example over the Court's certiorari policy and
what Harlan saw as "the rule of four" (which constrained him from voting
to dismiss a case as improvidently granted if the four who voted to grant
certiorari wanted a decision on the merits). This and many other
disagreements play out in their correspondence. Two features characterize
these disagreements. Substantively, Harlan never disagreed with
Frankfurter concerning the basic philosophy of federalism and separation
of powers. On this they were as one, with Frankfurter the teacher and link
for Harlan to the judicial philosophy of Brandeis and Cardozo. Second,
the disagreements between them were entirely without rancor. They
espoused the style of affectionate debaters for whom the exchange was
more important than the outcome. Harlan hardly ever betrayed himself
with a harsh word in any direction. Frankfurter was the hungrier of the
two for exchange. He was the one who most often initiated and kept
exchanges going, sometimes too long. But Harlan never lost patience or
took offense, instead delighting in a relationship that grew in warmth
through the years of their association. If Frankfurter was, in Alexander
Bickel's words, the "Michelangelo of friendship,"38 Harlan was fully
capable of reciprocating.
I met Frankfurter only once. Midway through my clerkship year,
1965, Frankfurter came to Harlan's chambers for a visit. In a wheelchair,
eighty-one years old, recovering from his second stroke and obviously
impaired by it, Frankfurter sat, hunched over to one side of the chair, a
tiny frail figure. Harlan, with his proudest smile, pushed Frankfurter's
36. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (Feb. 1956).
37. Letter from John M. Harlan to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 16, 1956).
38. Alexander M. Bickel, Frankfurter and Friend, NEW REPUBuC, Feb. 3, 1968, at
27, 27.
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chair from the main hallway through the doorway to our clerks' office,
where they chatted with us about the Court. Frankfurter flashed anger
very easily. When mention was made of Justice Goldberg, who had
replaced Frankfurter on the Court, Frankfurter hissed an epithet, the
meaning of which I gathered only from his intensity: "Goldberg, that
dance-hall lawyer!" Harlan responded lightly to bridge the awkward
moment, still perhaps the "nice guy" from Princeton who thought the old
man was too outspoken with his feelings. But Harlan, I knew, shared
many of Frankfurter's feelings about the Court and differed with him
primarily in his degree of circumspection.
Harlan came to the Supreme Court with an open attitude and without
any overarching philosophy, ready to engage with his colleagues in a joint
deliberative process. He was fully capable of making liberal decisions, as
shown, for example, by his early opinions in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson and Poe v. Ullman.4' But he was also a man of deep
modesty, both in his personal life and especially in his instinctive
conception of his role as a judge. The Warren Court majority, with its
anti-collegial manners and its rush to overturn precedent, offended him.
He thought it cabalistic, arrogant, disrespectful of the past, and too much
in a hurry. He became upset with the majority when it acted as if its
power to generate new constitutional rules was virtually unconstrained. 4'
Frankfurter fostered and applauded this reaction, and in Frankfurter's
teaching, Harlan found ammunition to respond. The values of federalism
gave Harlan a framework within which to articulate his disagreement with
the Warren Court majority in a way that transcended his own personal
outrage. Judicial restraint was his objective. 42 He tried to restrain the
majority with every legal argument he could muster-history, logic,
policy-all, apparently, to no immediate effect.
What would Harlan's position have been had he been among judges
whose approach to law he trusted? I suspect he would have been more
balanced about deciding issues of social change, more willing to recognize
that respect for the dictates of the past is a policy to be assessed in
39. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
40. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the "current mistaken view of the Constitution and the constitutional function
of this Court .... that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some
constitutional 'principle,' and that this Court should 'take the lead' in promoting reform
when other branches of government fail to act"); John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a
Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J.943, 943 (1963)
(challenging "the view of the judicial function that ....
all deficiencies in our society
which have failed of correction by other means should find a cure in the courts").
42. See Harlan, supra note 41.
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context. Harlan might have been willing to override precedent when he
considered stability in the law less important than establishing good new
law. That judges should exercise such power, however, is a proposition
Harlan would recognize only in the company of those he trusted. In fact,
he found himself in the company of people who appeared to him
unseemingly eager to change the law. He saw them as dangerously
arrogant, and therefore assumed the role of dissenter, steadfastly
defending precedent, federalism, and judicial restraint.'
Justice Brennan was counterpoint to Frankfurter as a shaping force on
Harlan. Brennan was Eisenhower's next appointment after Harlan, and
Harlan welcomed him warmly to the Court." They struck an immediate
social friendship that Harlan cultivated by nominating and sponsoring
Brennan for membership in the Century Club. Their friendship continued
through the years and times of their most heated judicial disagreements,
a tribute to both of them. Yet a gulf separated them in their work.
Harlan's negative reaction to Brennan's opinions was so marked that it
changed Harlan's most fundamental concept of his role, and pushed him
sharply in Frankfiurter's direction.
Harlan came to the Supreme Court thinking of it as a collegial body
of good men working together. He prized civility and harmony. I doubt
very much that he had any inkling he would wind up at an extreme.
Harlan himself made this clear in a talk he gave in New York in 1956:
I am inclined to think that dissenting opinions are sometimes due
as much to inadequate advocacy of opposing views within the
court as they are to basic differences of opinion among the
judges. And when that is so, dissenting opinions are often apt to
be little more than vehicles for expressing ideas that should have
been threshed out within the conference. For my part, such
opinions are better left unwritten.'
This statement assumes a model of the Court in which a group of judges
with a common central core of understanding about deliberation and the
role of reason work in dialogue with each other to achieve the best
results. Justice Brennan disillusioned him. Harlan came to believe that
43. See supra note 41.
44. See Stanley H. Priedelbaum, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.: Policy-Maklng in
the Judicial Thicket, in THE BURGER COURT: PO.ITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 100, 102

(Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1961). Justice Brennan joined the Court in
1957. Id.
45. Shapiro, supra note 3, at xxv-xxvi (quoting John M. Harlan, Some Impressions
and Observations of a Newcomer to the Federal Bench, Address Delivered Before the New
York Patent Law Association (Mar. 14, 1956)).
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Brennan and his confederates in the Warren Court majority twisted both
the law and the facts to achieve whatever result they wanted.
Harlan's first shock from Brennan came in a case in which Harlan did
not participate. Harlan's biggest and most important case prior to
becoming a judge was United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. ,'
a giant antitrust suit brought by the United States against duPont. The suit
charged anticompetitive effects from duPont's ownership of twenty-three
percent of General Motors, an acquisition duPont had made more than
thirty years before.4 7 The government's main contention was that
duPont's acquisition and continued retention of the GM stock gave it an
illegal preference over competitors in the sale to GM of automotive
finishes and fabrics.' Harlan, before he joined the bench, had been chief
counsel for the duPont interests.49 His defense of duPont and GM in this
immense and important case was the pinnacle of his litigating career. He
tried the case for seven months in a federal court in Chicago and won a
resounding victory. At the conclusion of the trial the judge dismissed the
government's charges, ruling that duPont's acquisition of the GM stock
had not been anticompetitive.'
Harlan was appointed to the Second Circuit and then to the Supreme
Court while the case was making its way to the Supreme Court. Harlan
did not, of course, participate in the argument or decision of the case in
the Supreme Court, but watched its progress and waited for the outcome
with intense interest. duPont lost.5" Brennan wrote the opinion of the
Court, basing the decision on a novel legal theory that he virtually
imported into the case, combined with a factual premise that the record
did not support.2
46. 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. I1. 1954), rev'd, 353 U.S. 5856 (1957).
47. See id. at 237, 240.
48. See id. at 237.
49. See id. at 236. Harlan at this time was a partner at Root, Ballantine, Harlan,
Bushby & Palmer. Id.
50. See id. at 335.
51. See duPont, 353 U.S. at 607.
52. See id. at 588 n.5; The supreme Court, 1956 Term-Leading Cases, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 85, 166 n.427 (1957). Brennan interpreted the Clayton Act to extend to vertical
acquisitions, despite contrary interpretations, by the Federal Trade Commission and
Congress, see id. at 166 nn.430-31, and to retention of acquisitions even though the initial
acquisition was perfectly lawful. He asserted as his central factual premise that automotive
finishes and fabrics were sufficiently different from other finishes and fabrics to make them
a distinct line of commerce. See duPont, 353 U.S. at 593-94. Only if the market was
defined in this narrow way was duPont's share of the market significant. Professor Areeda,
in his treatise on antitrust law, suggests that this market differentiation was not real. See
2 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
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Harlan was dismayed and devastated by the duPont decision. He
wrote to Frankfurter that he could hardly recognize the case from
Brennan's opinion.13 He confided to Frankfurter that nothing had
disillusioned him more since he had come to the Court.' This letter of
Harlan's was the single most striking document in his papers, clearly
expressing a heartfelt, critical view of another Justice in a manner
sufficiently out of character for Harlan to emphasize the depth of his
feeling.
Frankfuler had earlier tried to disabuse Harlan of his collegial image
of the Court, and to warn him against the hazards of disillusionment.
Frankfurter wrote to Harlan:
I beg of you not to allow yourself to go in for heartbreaks by
operating under the illusion that everybody has the same belief in
the processes of law that guide you. There is all the difference in
the world between starting with a result and clothing it in some
appropriate verbal garb, and starting with a problem and letting
it lead where it will.55
Frankfurter liked to knock Brennan. "Cock-sure" was Frankfurter's
favorite sobriquet for him. "I wish [Bill] were less shallow and thereby
less cock-sure," he wrote to Harlan.'
"Too much ego in his cosmos." When Paul Freund was here
recently-and Paul Freund is as wise as any member of the
profession I know-he asked, "Is my classmate Bill as cocksure
as his opinions indicate?" Cocksuredness begets [in]sensitiveness
57

Such barbs at Brennan salt the correspondence:
I wish I could think as well of what I write as does Bill B. of his
opinions!58

PRINCIPI AND THEIR APPICATION 535, at 418 (1978) (stating that "[t]he specific
evidence relied upon by the Court was quite insufficient to support this conclusion").
53. See Letter from John M. Harlan to Felix Frankfurter (undated, 1957).
54. See id.
55. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan, supra note 14.
56. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (undated, 1957).
57. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (Sept. 12, 1957).
58. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (undated, 1960).
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And again:
The underlying difference between Bill Brennan and me is, I
suspect, a different conception of opinion-writing. He thinks a big
case-that is, one in which the public has a lively interest-calls
for a big opinion."
Frankfurter's embrace of Harlan at Brennan's expense was reflected
by Harvard Law School's similar reaction. Henry Hart, Professor at
Harvard Law and disciple of Frankfurter, wrote his famous Time Chart
of the Justices as the foreword to the HarvardLaw Review in 1959.1 His
thesis was that the Court was so overwhelmed with business that the
quality of its work was falling. 6 He spoke urgently of the need for
collective deliberation as an essential part of the judicial process.62
"[T]oo many of the Court's opinions," he said, "are about what one
would expect could be written in twenty-four hours."' "These failures
are threatening to undermine the professional respect of first rate lawyers
for the incumbent Justices of the Court."'
Hart illustrated his thesis of breakdown by shredding Brennan's
opinion for the Court in Irvin v. Dowd.' Irvin, convicted of murder and
sentenced to death, escaped while his motion for a new trial was
pending.' Because of his escape, the Indiana courts denied Irvin relief,
as did the lower federal court when Irvin, back in custody, tried to raise
federal issues on habeas.67 The case in the Supreme Court raised a tough
question of habeas jurisdiction: what should happen when a state prisoner
precludes himself, by escaping, from getting a ruling on his federal claims
by the state's highest court. Brennan, writing for a bare majority of the
Court, brushed aside the impediments to habeas corpus jurisdiction.6 8
Harlan led the dissenters.'
59. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (Feb. 23, 1960).
60. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The 7Tme Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L.
Rnv. 84 (1959).
61. See id.at84.
62. See id.at 100.
63. Id.
64. Id.at 101.
65. 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
66. Id.at 400.
67. See id. at 402-03.
68. See id. at 406.
69. See id. at 412 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Hart's critique of Brennan's opinion was unmerciful. "To explicate in
short compass all that is wrong with [Brennan's] reasoning is not easy,"71
included "simply unbelievable,"
declared Hart.' Hart's invectives
"72 "fudged, " 73 "befuddling," 74 "flat, "75
"transparently76 indefensible,
"gratuitous,"
"intolerable,"' and "a technical mistake of a kind which
ought not to be made in an opinion of the Supreme Court" 7 -- one that
"twists facts and words at its pleasure"' and "triples the confusion. " '
While holding Brennan's opinion up to ridicule, Hart described
Harlan, by contrast, as having written an "elaborately reasoned
dissent," 8 ' containing "careful analysis" ' and "convincing
demonstration."' Hart's basic attack was premised on the question why
Harlan's opinion, joined by three other Justices, did not commend itself
to the majority even enough to merit a response."
In fact, Harlan's papers do reflect a communication from Brennan to
Harlan about the case that Hart, had he known about it, would
undoubtedly have used it for further ammunition. Brennan clipped a
newspaper item titled "Today's Chuckle" and sent it to Harlan with a note
saying:
I can't find a place in my opinion in Irvin v. Dowd for the
attached, but perhaps you can fit it somewhere in your
opinion.Y
The item read as follows:

70. Hart, supra note 60, at 108.
71. Id. at 110.

72. Id.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

118.
119.
113.
110.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 114.
79. Id. at 110.
80. Id. at 111.
81. Id.
82." Id.at 119.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Letter from William J.Brennan to John M. Harlan (Apr. 15, 1959).
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"I'll carry this case to the highest court in the land," said the
lawyer to the prisoner, "but in the meantime you'd better try to
escape."'
What Hart saw as a breakdown in the process of collective decision
making became institutionalized when Arthur Goldberg replaced
Frankfurter," giving Brennan a lock majority. The heyday of the Warren
Court had begun. To use Richard Posner's words, "[tihe Brennan
chambers were the cockpit of the revolution.""8 One revolutionary
procedure that deeply offended Harlan was the practice of circulating draft
majority opinions on a limited basis to the five members of the majority
and getting the necessary joins to make it an opinion of the Court before
ever exposing it to dissenting critique. Once the majority was locked, the
majority opinion-writer cared very little about what was said in dissent.
This dynamic explains, I suspect, why Brennan's opinion in Irvin is
unresponsive to Harlan's dissent. Brennan probably had his majority
before Harlan's dissent ever circulated.
Harlan was pushed in Frankfurter's direction by the attitudes and
practices of Brennan and the Warren Court majority. Increasingly, Harlan
found himself on a Court with fellow judges who did not share his values
and did not respect his views. Brennan and his colleagues seemed
contemptuous of history and disdainful of judicial restraint. To quote
Richard Posner again, "a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court disdained
the principles of conventional legal reasoning symbolized by the Harvard
Law School in its heyday."' Harlan, though not himself a graduate of
Harvard, agreed with those principles of conventional legal reasoning. He
came by them through Buckner, and was applauded by Frankfurter's
disciples at Harvard for exhibiting them. Harvard virtually adopted Harlan
as its prince on the Court, in clear preference to Brennan even though
Brennan was a Harvard alumnus. Harvard awarded Harlan an honorary
degree in 1964, calling him a "judge's judge."
John Lord O'Brian, senior partner at Covington & Burling, gave a
flavor of the approbation of the bar for Harlan in a letter congratulating
him on receiving Harvard's honorary degree. O'Brian wrote:

86. Id.
87. Goldberg was nominated by President Kennedy on August 31, 1962, to replace
Frankfurter, who retired on August 28, 1962. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND
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I sometimes wonder if you realize what a unique place you hold
in the minds of members of the Bar generally. All of them envy
your courage as well as your power of expression, particularly in
the recent dissenting opinions. I especially appreciate this because
of my sympathy with the Brandeis view, which was perpetuated
by Felix and now is being expressed by you. You can have no
idea how many lawyers look upon you as the main stay of the
present Court. . . .For the Bar generally regard you as their
chosen representative on the Court. . . .I know that in saying

this I am voicing the opinion of a vast number of lawyers who do
not know you personally, but who have very much at heart the
preservation of the prestige of the Court.'
The passing of the torch from Frankfurter to Harlan came with the
reapportionment cases. 91 The need for the Supreme Court to stay out of
the "political thicket" of reapportionment was fundamental to
Frankfurter's judicial philosophy. He regarded his opinion in Colegrove
v. Green,' in which he coined the metaphor of the political thicket,'
as one of his wisest. Harlan shared Frankfurter's attitude toward
reapportionment completely. After the argument in Baker v. Carr' in the
fall of 1961, Harlan wrote a letter to Justices Whittaker and Stewart, with
a blind copy to Frankfurter.95 Harlan appears to have been acting here
at least in part on Frankfurter's behalf, Harlan being the more diplomatic
of the two and much more likely than Frankfurter to receive a good
audience. Harlan opened his letter by observing that Whittaker and
Stewart's votes would very likely determine the outcome of the case,
which, he said, involved implications for the future of the Court of
importance unmatched by "any case coming here in my time."' "The
independence of the Court, and its aloofness from political vicissitudes
have always been the mainspring of its stability and vitality."' Harlan
saw the Court's independence being threatened, and predicted that the
States would not reapportion themselves, even under federal threat. For

90. Letter from John Lord O'Brian to John M. Harlan (June 19, 1964).
91. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
92. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
93. See id. at 556.
94. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
95. See Letter from John M. Harlan to Charles E. Whittaker and Potter Stewart (Oct.
11, 1961).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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this reason, he considered Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove to be
"among the wisest and farsighted decisions of the Court."" "The
responsibility is entirely in our laps,"' he concluded. "It would be a sad
thing were we by our own act to place this institution into what would bid
fair, as time goes on, to erode its stature." 1" Harlan did not ask
Whittaker and Stewart to respond, but awaited their vote on the circulated
opinions.
Brennan circulated an opinion in Baker v. Carr for a tentative
majority which effectively overruled Colegrove and opened the way for
subsequent reapportionment cases by declaring the issue of legislative
apportionment to be justiciable. Frankfurter put his last judicial energies
into a dissent, blasting away with all guns.10 With other votes in doubt,
Warren made a strong speech in conference in an effort to bring his
authority as Chief Justice to bear in favor of Brennan's opinion. Tom
Clark, who had previously joined Frankfurter's dissent, withdrew and
decided to concur with the majority, 1" as did Stewart."° Whittaker
did not vote.
Frankfurter was distressed by Warren's effectiveness. Following the
conference Frankfurter wrote Harlan:
Dear John: What powerfully emerged for me this afternoon is that
men who so readily impose their will on the nation and its fifty
states by exultingly overruling their most distinguished
predecessors behave like subservient children -whenlectured by a
martinet with a papa-knows-best complacency. At the core of the
sad performance was-is-a failure to appreciate the intrinsic and
acquired majesty of the Court's significance in the affairs of the
country and of the correlative responsibility of every member of
the Court to maintain and further this significance.
Why do I bother you with this? I suppose to prove the tenet
of a German saying that when the heart is full it spills over. And
so it spills over to you-who alone gives me comfort.'

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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When the Court's opinion came down three weeks later, Frankfurter
and Harlan were alone in dissent. A week later, Frankfurter collapsed in
his office with his second stroke, effectively ending his judicial career.
Harlan's dissent in Baker v. Carr' was measured. He left to
Frankfurter the display of anger and high rhetoric, consciously holding
himself back. He noted this in his letter to Frankfurter joining
Frankfurter's dissent:
I am going to let things simmer for a few days, and then see what
comes out on paper. I feel so deeply about what is in prospect,
that before adding anything to what you have so well said, I want
to make sure that I am not letting my emotions run away with
me. 106

In the next few years, with Frankfurter gone from the Court, Harlan
let his emotions out. Harlan's dissents in Wesberry v. Sanders07 and
Reynolds v. Sims1" show very little emotional restraint. These opinions
embody Harlan's break with the Court and the emergence of his matured
concept of himself as a dissenter, an outsider, whose job it was to
preserve the values of reason and restraint inherent in a proper
understanding of federalism and judicial role.
Did Harlan see himself this way? The best answer comes from
Harlan's own words. When Frankfurter died, Harlan sought to describe
his friend's greatness. Harlan's words seem a statement of his own ideal.
It is not unreasonable to think that what Harlan saw as Frankfurter's
greatest qualities he would hold as his own aspiration.
He did not hesitate to withhold his assent to results which he
personally believed to be good when he felt that they could be
achieved only at the expense of ignoring or taking impermissible
shortcuts through what had gone before....
...
Few men in our history have had as great perception of
the values of American federalism or as sensitive an
understanding of the subtleties that make for its healthy working.
Over and over again his dedication to it is reflected in his
constitutional opinions. I shall be greatly mistaken if history does
not place his belief in federalism at the forefront of his
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108.
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constitutional thinking and rank him high among those who have
made lasting contributions to its preservation in the context of
their times. 1"
Harlan played a great role in dissent, regardless of one's ultimate
judgment on the merits of specific cases. The Justices of the Supreme
Court are, as Rostow said, "teachers in a vital national seminar.""° The
Supreme Court educates as well as judges; the dialogue among the Justices
is a symbolic discourse for the country, a kind of seminar in law and
public policy. Issues that come before the Court often present questions,
not of right or wrong, but rather of competing wisdoms, the question
being, what is the wisest course? Often there is wisdom even in the path
not chosen, wisdom that can be heard by the present generation and
preserved for future generations only through the voice of a reasoned
dissenter, wisdom that is lost if only the voice of the majority is heard.
Harlan was a great dissenter because he maintained a balance in the
dialectic of the Court, articulating and preserving the wisdom of the past.
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